Upbringing, Rehabilitation, Treatment, Learning, or Training
The provisions described in Article 3(2)(a) of the labor law, pertaining to relationships concerning “upbringing, rehabilitation, treatment, learning, or training,” are characterized by their vagueness, failing to delineate the specific circumstances under which these exclusions apply. This imprecision often leads to considerable confusion in both interpretation and implementation. A salient illustration of this challenge is found in S.C. File No. 101396 (Applicant Addis General Hospital and Respondent Dr. Misrak Tilaye, December 21, 2007 E.C., Vol. 17). In this case, the respondent, a radiologist, was employed by the applicant hospital for two hours daily, earning 8,000 Birr per month, before her contract was terminated. The Cassation Bench, in determining whether the respondent qualified as an employee under the Proclamation, erroneously categorized the contractual agreement between the hospital and the radiologist as a hospital contract falling under Article 2641 of the Civil Code.
Within the Civil Code, two distinct contracts pertain to medical treatment: the medical contract and the hospital contract, both of which are concluded with a patient. According to Article 2639 of the Civil Code, a medical contract is defined as: “…a contract whereby a doctor undertakes, for a consideration, to perform medical services for a person and to keep him in good health as far as possible or to cure him.” This medical contract is established directly between the doctor and the patient, with treatment potentially rendered either at the patient’s location or at the doctor’s permanent service facility. Article 2641 of the Civil Code defines a hospital contract as an agreement where a medical institution assigns one or more doctors to enable a patient to receive medical services. Although the contractual relationship is primarily with the medical institution or the doctor, the patient ultimately receives services through the doctor designated by the institution.
It is crucial to distinguish that doctors within a medical institution, regardless of their ownership stake, may function as employees who share profits based on their generated income or receive a fixed monthly salary. An employment-based relationship between a hospital (health institution) and its employed doctors fundamentally differs in both content and purpose from a medical or hospital contract. Importantly, Article 3(2)(a) does not exclude the employment relationship established between a medical institution and the doctors it employs. Furthermore, this provision does not concern medical or hospital contracts formed directly between a doctor and a patient under Civil Code Articles 2639 or 2641, precisely because these contracts do not involve an employment-based relationship. Similarly, a contract between an organization caring for orphaned children and an employee hired to provide supervision and care to foster their education, discipline, and physical development is not excluded under this provision.
The English version of the law describes the relationships excluded as “for upbringing, for treatment or recovery from illness or for rehabilitation” as originating from a contract. However, the Amharic version employs a vague expression that does not explicitly indicate that the exclusion targets contracts specifically made for upbringing, rehabilitation, or treatment. This contradictory and inconsistent phrasing across the two versions inevitably imbues the exclusionary article with two divergent meanings. Therefore, to precisely identify the nature of the relationship intended for exclusion from the Proclamation, a comparative analysis of these alternative meanings becomes essential.
According to the Amharic text, the Proclamation aims to exclude employment relationships that arise incidentally when vulnerable segments of society, participating in a specific program or project, converge in a center to receive care, supervision, and support while concurrently undertaking work or providing services. For example, in an elderly rehabilitation center, residents may engage in various work activities (such as weaving, metalwork, or carpentry) after receiving appropriate training. This engagement is intended to foster a sense of independence and generate partial income. The revenue generated from these activities is then utilized to strengthen the center, cover operational expenses, and partially remunerate the elderly for their work. An employment-based relationship formed in this context, being an incidental outcome of the rehabilitation program, is not governed by labor law. Analogously, the phrase “for upbringing, for treatment or recovery from illness” suggests the exclusion of employment relationships incidentally created within programs and projects involving orphaned children, street children, juvenile delinquents, or addicted youth.
Conversely, the English version’s expression, “contracts for the purpose of upbringing, treatment, care or rehabilitation,” implies that contracts specifically executed for these purposes (e.g., to raise children, to care for the elderly, or to provide home care for the sick) fall outside the scope of labor law. Occasionally, a contract for upbringing might involve assuming responsibility for an underage child from a government institution or another organization for their care and upbringing. In essence, the English version conveys that an employment-based relationship established between a service provider and recipient for the purposes of upbringing or care is excluded from the Proclamation.
This situation vividly illustrates the concept of legislative ambiguity. When different linguistic versions of a law, or even disparate sections within the same language, offer conflicting or unclear definitions, it poses significant challenges for consistent interpretation and practical application. Such ambiguity can necessitate judicial activism, compelling courts to address legislative gaps, or it can lead to legal uncertainty, thereby complicating individuals’ and organizations’ understanding of their rights and obligations.
Learning or Training
The analytical framework applied to Article 3(2)(a) similarly aids in understanding the content of Article 3(2)(b), which pertains to “learning or training.” A contract for learning or training is typically established directly between a teacher and a student, or a trainee and a trainer, or between an educational institution and a student, or a training institution and a trainee. However, the Proclamation does not exclude relationships arising from these contracts, as their fundamental nature is not employment-based. Instead, Article 3(2)(b) targets the incidental work performed by students or trainees during field practice (internship) that is directly related to their education or training. For example, medical students, after completing a certain number of years of classroom instruction, provide medical services in various hospitals while receiving remuneration. This service constitutes an integral part of their educational curriculum. Consequently, an employment relationship incidentally created in this manner is not covered by the Labor Proclamation.
This distinction underscores the critical principle of differentiating between educational/training relationships and employment relationships. While practical experience is indispensable in many professional fields, the primary objective of an internship or practical training is learning and skill development, not the provision of labor within a conventional employment context. Nevertheless, the line between these two can become indistinct, particularly when interns perform productive work and receive compensation. Legal frameworks frequently endeavor to prevent the exploitation of trainees under the guise of education by ensuring that the paramount purpose remains learning and that any work performed is strictly incidental to that learning process.